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SHANTIR SWAPNEY: SAMAYER SMRITICHARON
Gen. Moin’s book: Fiction overshadows facts
Ranu Chowdhury
Bangladesh’s former army chief Gen. (Retd) Moin U Ahmed published a book entitled Shantir Swapney: Samayer Smriticharon recently. I read an abridged version of the book.
One tends to add a little fiction to facts, particularly when it comes to autobiography. Retired Gen. Moin could not be immune to such temptation. However, when fiction overshadows facts, eyebrows do rise.
Moin U Ahmed must be a saintly person to whom our prophet (PBUH) chose to appear in dream. I understand, according to Hadith, such chosen ones are guaranteed a place in the Heaven. How many, out of over a billion Muslims in the world, are so fortunate!
We heard former president Lieutenant General (Retd.) Ershad always dreamt of the mosque he would visit the following Friday for Juma prayers, and a barren Roushan Ershad became pregnant and gave birth to Shaad at old age.
Offence under law
Gen. Moin had a fixed political orientation. He made more political speeches than the politicians following the 1/11 —- an offence under military law. He did not make secret of his preference for a major political party and admiration for its supreme leader, at the same time condemning the others in those speeches.
A lot of mystery shrouded the 1/11 that brought in the two-year long emergency rule in Bangladesh. Thanks to the retired General for sharing his side of the story.
“Yesuddin”
We expect the other star of the 1/11, former president Dr. Iajuddin Ahmed [prior to the second Caretaker Government Sheikh Hasina contemptuously called him “Yesuddin”’], to do the same, for the sake of clarity. However, I am not so sure if Iajuddin would do us that favour. He was known to listen to HMV (His Masters’ Voice) more than required. He listened to Hawa Bhaban for five years, even perhaps when the BNP relinquished its authority. He listened to the military’s dictation on 1/11 and thereafter. Even during his one-month tenure under Sheikh Hasina, he forgot who was Ziaur Rahman.
Coming to the Shantir Swapney, unbiased analysts may point out some of the missing elements and glaring discrepancies.
In his book there is no mention of General Rezzaqul Haider Chowdhury’s reported appointment as the new army chief replacing Moin, because of latter’s failure to halt the widespread violence that caused damage to life and property prior to 1/11. One can understand the cause behind this omission!
Subsequent reports did not corroborate General Moin’s assertion that UN was considering to withdraw Bangladesh from the global peace missions, if its army supported the elections on January 22, 2007. The UN Secretary General himself denied any such move.
Aug. 15 – Nov. 7, 1975
The story he described about the events from August 15 to November 7, 1975 leaves much to be desired. However, one may not ignore the fact that he was a newly commissioned Second Lieutenant at that time. And, according to army parlance, a 2/Lt is to be seen only, not to be heard.
There is not much scope here to discuss the circumstances that led to the coup on August 15, 1975. One needs to walk back in time to the early 70s of Bangladesh, particularly 1974 and 1975, and then evaluate the August coup. It would be totally wrong to judge the August coup in today’s context.
There is no denying that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was one of the great leaders of Bangladesh. Few could surpass his leadership quality and contribution towards the emancipation of erstwhile East Pakistanis for their rights. Yet, I fail to understand why he had engaged himself in lengthy negotiations with the Pakistanis, following his noteworthy speech on March 7, 1971?
Well, that was the Sheikh Mujib before 1971. But, what happened to Bangladesh from 1972 to 1975 —- the creation of the monstrous Rakkhi Bahini, the man-made famine that killed nearly half a million in 1974 - 1975, the clamping of emergency in 1974, the introduction of one-party dictatorship through BAKSAL in 1975, the 5th, constitutional amendment in 1975 and et all? Can one forget and forgive that? Why did people forget to say Innalillah when they heard of his death?
Forces Chiefs’ loyalty to Mushtaque
Moin asserts that the August coup was done purely on personal grudge by a group of junior army officers, while the rest of the defence forces were not involved. What then prevented the rest of the forces to act and crush that small group? Why then all the chiefs fell head over heels to present themselves before the new president Khandakar Mushtaque Ahmed and publicly announce their support and allegiance to him?
Just for information, when Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, the army chief of general staff, was told that the tanks that were taken out on the night of the coup did not have the ammunition for their main guns, he immediately sent out a handwritten note to issue shells for the cannons.
Later, however, when an ambitious Brig. Khaled failed to gain any favour from the coup leaders, he started plotting against them.
Gen. Moin said that coup leaders were running the country from Bangabhaban, and that infuriated the senior army officers. Well, as a newly appointed officer in the army, he was not supposed to know or see what had happened around that time. His knowledge must have been acquired from his likeminded peers.
AL MPs in Mushtaque cabinet
To refresh the memory, the President Mushtaque formed a cabinet composed entirely of the elected representatives of the Awami League (AL), on August 15, 1975. Parliament and constitution were not touched. As far as I know, none of the coup leaders were within miles of power, and Mushtaque was not a character to take dictation from others. There were reports of Farooq and Dalim showing off a little; but that was their personal style and certainly did not mean any disrespect to anybody.
Chiefs of defence forces and other senior officers used to visit the Bangabhaban on a regular basis in those days. Can anyone of them cite an instance when an August coup officer showed any disrespect to them at any stage? Not that I heard of.
I also learnt that most coup officers left Bangabhaban within a few days and lived with their families and in own residences.
Brig. Khaled, countercoup
Also, the August coup officers were not taken out of the country by any foreign aeroplane, as mentioned by General Moin. I understand, under an arrangement between Brig. Khaled and Bangabhaban, they were allowed to leave the country temporarily, with an assurance to bring them back as soon as the situation permitted. A Bangladesh Biman aircraft was used.
Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf and some of his over-zealous cohorts had some grudge against the August 15 coup leaders. It stemmed from their failure to be part of a spectacular historic event that was instantly hailed and welcomed at home and abroad. It was a kind of frustration of missing the boat. So they decided to do something to outdo the August 15 success. The result of this conspiracy was the devastating countercoup of November 3, 1975.
What a dedication to duty!
According to General Moin, he was sent to Bangabhaban to guard Khandakar Mushtaque Ahmed against any suicide attempt. This appears ludicrous. If Mushtaque wanted to commit suicide, how in the world a subaltern could stop it? 2/Lt Moin remained with the confined president almost 24 hours; hopefully not suggesting he accompanied him to bedroom and bathroom too. Our subaltern said he could go to his room to wash and change uniform only. He seemed to have no time to eat, sleep or bathe during those days. What a dedication to duty!
From various events of those days learnt from horses’ mouth, Khandakar Mushtaque did not seem to be a coward at all —- far from it, as described by our subaltern of the time.
Let me tell you what I learnt.
Brig. Khaled’s short-lived coup was a battle or nerves between his small band of officers in the Dhaka cantonment and the Bangabhaban. Public life was not disturbed much, except that the electronic media was off the air. Khaled wanted Bangabhaban to surrender to his command. Mushtaque, joined by his defence adviser General M A G Osmany, flatly refused. Brig Khaled then extended a carrot, requesting Mushtaque to continue as President while he ran the show.
Gen. Osmany, Mushtaque
Brigadier Rouf and Colonel Malek went to Bangabhaban with the proposal. Mushtaque coolly replied, “If you want me to remain the president, I will be the president, not your president”.
Frustrated at the stubbornness of the President, an arrogant Colonel Shafaat Jamil, the Dhaka Brigade Commander, stormed Bangabhaban and tried to obtain Mushataque’s resignation at gunpoint. Yet, Mushtaque did not budge an inch, and was kept confined there, along with Osmany. And, perhaps, our young 2/Lt Moin found himself doing guard duty there.
According to eye witnesses, an outraged Shafaat not only misbehaved with the elderly president and General Osmany but virtually manhandled them.
When Brig Khaled and Co. failed to subdue Mushtaque, they decided to appoint Chief Justice A S M Sayem the new president on November 6, 1975.
So, why would Mushtaque kill himself? Mushtaque was a devout Muslim, and would certainly not do something that is prohibited in Islam. In any case, if he did, it would have been a windfall benefit for Khaled.
Unfortunately for Khaled, his countercoup was not accepted outside his small circle of officers, definitely not by the military at large. It was seen to undo the August 15 changeover. Khaled was seen as an agent of AL —- and by extension India — a fact people could not accept at that time.
Gen. Zia’s arrest, Nov. 7
Arrest of Ziaur Rahman, a war hero and declarer of the independence, did not go well in the military chain of command.
By the night of November 6, troops in the Dhaka cantonment revolted and released General Ziaur Rahman from confinement. Brig Khaled, who was at Bangabhaban at that time, realised that his game was over. He, accompanied by Col Huda, Lt Col Haider and a few bodyguards, fled. They were intercepted and arrested at Sher-e-Bangla Nagar by 10 Bengal Regiment, Khaled’s onetime loyal unit, then commanded by Lt Col Nawazish.
Upon hearing the news, Zia instructed Nawazish to protect Khaled. But the angry troops killed their prize shortly afterwards. The troops stationed at Bangabhaban immediately aligned with the Sipahi-Janata (soldier-civilian) revolution, helped release Mushataque and joined the chanting masses in the parade. All military officers at Bangabhaban fled. Col Shafaat jumped over the southern wall and broke one of his legs. He was later arrested at a ferry ghat.
Yet, our young and brave 2/Lt continued to fight single-handed the popular uprising that night, a repeat of the Charge of the Light Brigade! He must have been pretty well-known even as a 2/Lt, because a soldier of the revolution knew that he was commissioned only 10 months ago, so no point killing the poor soul! However, others did not perhaps think so and took him to the back of the Bangabhaban to do the ritual, according to Moin.
It was a mass uprising; the revolutionaries do things upfront. Why would they waste time to take a tiny 2/Lt to a remote and lonely area to do the job? And again, why would a Havilder look for him among throngs of people that night?
Major (retd) Hafizuddin Ahmed, the former BNP minister and the Brigade Major (BM) to Shafaat Jamil, was a key figure to Khaled’s countercoup. Then Major (later Brigadier) Zubeyer Siddiqui played important role in rescuing Zia on November 6 night and reinstalling his authority at the army chief at 2 Field Regiment Artillery in the Dhaka cantonment. Both these officers are men of very high integrity and can throw more light on the events of November, 1975.
Email: ranu51@hotmail.com
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