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Bangladesh Liberation War and West Bengal
Talukder Maniruzzaman
THE Bangladesh liberation struggle in 1971 evoked great sympathy and support from the people of West Bengal, the Bengali speaking province of India which was separated from East Bengal as a result of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Apart from the spontaneous support of individuals and independent groups, all political parties in West Bengal except the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (CPML) gave a joint call for help and organised a complete general strike on March 31, 1971 in support of the Bangladesh liberation struggle. The West Bengal members of the Indian parliament, belonging to different political parties, raised the issue in the Indian Parliament soon after the army crackdown.
Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi of India was finally persuaded by the members from West Bengal to move a resolution in both houses of parliament on March 31, 1971, expressing “profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life.” [For the full text of the resolution passed by the Indian parliament see Bangladesh Documents (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1971), p. 672.]
The West Bengal MPs, however, were most vocal in urging recognition of the rebel government of Bangladesh. At the mass level, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the new idol of almost every Hindu home. By late 1971 the slogan “Joi Bangla” became as much a slogan for West Bengalis as it had been previously in Bangladesh.
One of the dominant characteristics of West Bengal’s political parties is their strict adherence to ideologies, elaborately formulated as party theses. [See M. Weincr, Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi Party System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 129-130.]
Political issues are interpreted according to these theses and support is generated on the basis of the party’s ideological framework. Thus, while most of the political parties in West Bengal supported the Bangladesh liberation struggle, their support was based on different ideological and. theoretical grounds. For the leaders of the Congress party, the liberation struggle, led by the Awami League, was aimed at the realisation of similar ideals of secularism, democracy and socialism, implying the triumph of Congress ideals, the wisdom of democracy, and a united struggle against exploitation and oppression in the whole Indian subcontinent [Interview with Congress leaders Ajoy Mukherjec and Bijoy Singh Nahar, 19 February, 1973.]
For the leaders of the Forward Bloc, Sheikh Mujib was the re-incarnation or Subhas Bose. [Interview with Ashok Ohosh, General Secretary, Forward Bloc, West Bengal State Committee, 17 February, 1973.]
The national liberation struggle conformed to the theoretical formulations of the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) since, according to its formulations at the time, any national liberation struggle represented the combination of all of the patriotic classes of the nation concerned. All liberation struggles are, according to the CPI, basically “anti-imperialist” from the first stage of “national democratic revolution,” even if they precede a socialist revolution.[ For an elaboration of the Moscow line on national liberation movements see O. Kapustin, The World Revolutionary Process at the Present State (Moscow: Novasti Agency Publishing House, 1972), pp. 132.167.]
The leaders of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), whose party thesis described India as a capitalist state and advocated immediate socialist revolution, viewed the Awami League as the party of the Bangladesh bourgeoisie. But they argued that a radical leadership emerging in the course of a liberation struggle could bring about national liberation and socialist revolution simultaneously. According to the leaders of the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM), which viewed the Indian government as representing the Indian bourgeoisie and landlord classes and advocated “Peoples democratic revolution,” the Awami League was representative of the nascent bourgeoisie classes, interests in Bangladesh. But CPM leaders argued that a qualitative change had taken place in the political development of Bangladesh as the autonomy movement led by the Awami League turned into a people’s liberation struggle. Victory for the Awami League, in the eyes of CPM theoreticians, would lead to the diminution of American imperialism’s influence in South Asia, particularly if it were coupled with the defeat of Pakistan. A defeat for Pakistan could also mean an internal social change, leading to the restoration of a peoples’ democracy in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. [Interview with Dr. Buddhadev Bhattacharyya, Member, Central Committee, RSPI on 16 February, 1973.]
Recruitment policy
During the liberation struggle CPM leaders continuously objected to the Indian government’s policy of recruiting Mukti Bahini members from the Awami League cadres only and urged a non-partisan recruitment policy. The CPM also argued against the demands made by the rightist parties of India— particularly the Jana Sangh—which advocated direct military intervention by the Indian army. The CPM demanded that the Indian government only provide arms, ammunition and auxiliary supplies to the Mukti Bahini. The CPM analysis assumed that without Indian direct intervention, the Mukti Bahini would have to recruit more widely from all political parties. This in turn would throw up more radical leaders and the leadership of the struggle would slip away from the Awami League. The Bangladesh struggle could, according to CPM theoreticians, telescope two revolutions — national emancipation and “people’s democratic revolution”—simultaneously.
The only politIcal party in West Bengal that was totally opposed to the Bangladesh liberation struggle was the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist (CPML), popularly, called the “Naxalite party”. Following the Chinese line, Naxalite leaders considered the Bangladesh struggle to be manipulated by the Russian “social imperialists” and Indian “neocolonial expansionists”. The independence of Bangladesh under the bourgeois leadership of foreign-based leaders “who have now lost their initiative”, according to the CPML, could hardly bring about a genuine liberation of Bangladesh peasants. The salvation of Bengali peasants could be secured only through a social revolution from within, led by hardened peasant guerrillas who would provide the necessary political and military leadership and ideology to the Bengali masses, preventing at the same time the ascendancy of neo-colonialism and mentor-state hegemony over this crucial geopolitical area masquerading as aid-givers to the ‘liberation war’.
In August-September 1971 the CPML split on the Bangladesh issue. One group, led by Ashim Chatterjee, argued that China’s support of Yahya Khan should be accepted by the Indian revolutionaries. It took the extreme position of putting Yahya Khan and Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in the same group of anti-US imperialists. The second group, led by Charu Mazumdar, was more in line with the popular anti-Pakistan mood of the Bangladesh freedom fighters. Although the fear of being branded anti-Chinese prevented Charu Mazumdar from directly supporting the freedom movement, he emphasised Yahya Khan’s reactionary nature, mentioning repeatedly the banning of the Communist Party in Pakistan and Yahya’s dependence on the landlord class.
Those political parties in West Bengal that supported the Bangladesh cause formed a number of organisations to assist the liberation struggle. In the last week of March 1971, when the Pakistan army started its operations against the people of Bangladesh, the CPM-led United Front coalition government of West Bengal fell from power and a new Democratic Coalition government—dominated by the Congress, the CPI and the Forward Bloc—took over on April 1, 1971. On the very next day the Democratic Coalition, in a meeting held at the office of the West Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee in Calcutta, formed the Bangladesh Sangram Sahayok Samiti (Association for the Assistance of the Bangladesh Liberation Struggle), with Ajoy Mukherjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, as President.
Assistance to Bangladesh Struggle
A similar organisation, sponsored by the CPM, was called the Bangladesh Sangram Sahayak Samiti (Association for the Assistance of the Bangladesh Struggle). The RSP formed another organ, Bangladesh Mukti Juddho Sahayata Samiti (Association for Assisting the Liberation War of Bangladesh). Two other voluntary organisations which were active in support of the Bangladesh cause, were the Calcutta University Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti (Calcutta University Association for the Assistance of Bangladesh), headed by Professor S.N. Sen, Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, and the Bangladesh Sahayak Shilipi Sahityik Buddhijibi Samiti (Organisation of Artists, Litterateurs and Intellectuals for the Assistance of Bangladesh), led by the renowned Bengali novelist Tarasankar Bondopadhyay.
These organisations collected a large amount of money in aid of the Bangladesh liberation struggle. The officially sponsored organisation—the Bangladesh Mukti Sangrarn Sahayak Samiti (BMSSS)—collected over 5 million rupees.
The BMJSS collected a fund of Rs. 60,000. Since the CPM had the largest mass base in the urban areas in West Bengal, the Bangladesh Sangrarn Sahayak Samiti (BSSS) was able to collect the largest fund from the general public in West Bengal, totalling over Rs. 2 million. In addition, the BSSS collected goods and materials worth over Rs. 600,000. The Calcutta University Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti (CUBSS) collected a fund of about Rs. 596,000 in cash and Rs. 250,000 in material, especially medicine. The Bangladesh Sahayak Sahityik Buddhijibi Samiti also collected a fund of about Rs. 200,000.
These organisations launched a massive campaign, both inside and outside West Bengal, organising public meetings, publicity films and publication. The publicity campaign of the Calcutta University Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti was directed mainly to elicit support from among the intellectuals. It was especially successful in the western provinces of India and abroad.
The second programme of Bangladesh assistance organisations was to offer aid to the Mukti Bahini. Before the Indian army took over the supply of arms, the Bangladesh assistance organisations had to procure arms and ammunition for the Mukti Bahini from individuals with licensed guns and rifles, or from licensed gun manufacturers. Arms without seals were procured from Indian ordnance factories with the support of the relevant authorities, and some arms were also reportedly collected from the embassies of certain foreign countries with the knowledge of the Indian government. Besides, some of the assistance organisations employed scientists to make hand bombs, grenades, and other explosives.
The assistance organisations also purchased wireless sets, transistors, batteries, gasoline and other auxiliary supplies in the open market for the Mukti Bahini. Even after the Indian army took over training and supply of arms for the Mukti Bahini, subsidiary supplies of clothing, food, medicine, transistors, and wireless sets were continued by the assistance organisations until the time of the liberation.
In considering assistance to the Mukti Bahini, the organisations sponsored by the political parties of West Bengal preferred to help the Mukti Bahini camps opened by their fraternal political parties of Bangladesh. As the officially sponsored organisation dominated by the Congress, the BMSSS at the beginning channelled all of its assistance to the youth reception and Mukti Bahini training camps organised by the Awami League government-in-exile.
After some time the CPI members of BMSSS began to complain that the workers belonging to their fraternal parties — the NAP (pro-Moscow) and the Bangladesh Communist Party were being deliberately excluded from entry into the youth reception and Mukti Bahini camps opened by the Awami League government. When NAP and BCP opened several youth reception and training camps, the BMSSS, under pressure from the CPI, began to help these camps too with arms and material supplies.
The CPM-sponsored BSSS had its links with the NAP (pro-Peking) group, a dissident faction of the EBCP, the Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries and dissident factions of the East Pakistan Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist (EPCPML). Like the CPM, these pro-Peking political parties and factions of Bangladesh considered the Chinese policy of opposition to the Liberation War totally out of tune with the ideological line propagated by the Chinese themselves. These parties. Therefore, declared their full support for the Bangladesh struggle. Leaders and workers of the pro-Peking parties that took shelter in West Bengal were, however, much distrusted both by the Indian government and the Awami League government-in-exile. Maulana Bhashani was not even allowed to see CPM leaders, nor was he allowed to meet his party workers in Calcutta. He had to stay in New Delhi during most of the liberation struggle.
When Mashiur Rahman, the general secretary of NAP (Bhashani) came to Calcutta, he was also reportedly kept under surveillance and returned back to Bangladesh within a short time. Most of the leaders and cadres of the pro-Peking camps of Bangladesh did stay in West Bengal, however, and they eventually formed a Bangladesh Mukti Sangram Somonnoy Committee (Coordination Committee for the Bangladesh Liberation Struggle). The Somonnoy Committee opened two youth reception and Mukti Bahini camps. The BSSS supported and maintained these two camps. Obviously, known members of these camps were not allowed to join those Bahini later trained and armed by the Indian army.
The evacuees from Bangladesh who came to West Bengal and other neighbouring provinces of India during the period of the liberation war were maintained in camps established by a special organisation of the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of India. The political leaders and intellectuals from Bangladesh who took shelter in India could not remain confined to camp life. The third programme of activities of the assistance organisations in West Bengal was to give financial assistance to these political leaders and intellectuals. The BMISSS maintained the families of Awanii League leaders. Some of the NAP (pro-Moscow) leaders were also looked after by the BMSSS. The RSP sponsored BMJSS maintained the leaders of their fraternal organisation in Bangladesh, the Krishak Sramik Samajabadi Dal (Peasants and Workers’ Socialist Party). The CPM-sponsored BSSS gave shelter to and maintained the leaders of the pro-Chinese camp of Bangladesh. The CUBSS organised a large programme of assistance to the evacuate teachers and intellectuals from Bangladesh.
Another aspect of the activities of the Bangladesh assistance organisations was to check the outbreak of communal riots in West Bengal, between Hindus and Muslims threatened by the dislocations resulting from migration. Of those who migrated, something like 80 to 90 per cent were Hindus, who brought with them reports of the Pakistan army’s determined and brutal attempt to annihilate the Bengali Hindus.
The depth and extent of West Bengal’s involvement in the Bangladesh liberation struggle could be gauged from the large amount of public donations to the funds of the various Bangladesh assistance organisations. As Jyoti Basu told this author, “Never in the history of the life of our party could we raise so much money from so many people as we could on the issue of Bangladesh.” What were the reasons for the tremendous mass upsurge in West Bengal for the Bangladesh cause? The nearness of the scene of atrocities, ethnic affiliations, West Bengali fascination for militant and violent politics—-all of these, of course, played an important part in rousing mass support in West Bengal. But there were other reasons as well. Some clues to these can be derived from the demographic characteristics of the leaders of the various voluntary organisations whose activities we have surveyed above.
The author collected the bio-data of 60 persons who were office-bearers or members of the executive committees of the three organisations— CUBSS, BMSSS and BMJSS—which were most active in organising assistance for the Bangladesh struggle. As shown in the Table above, 60 per cent of the most active leaders of the three organisations were refugees who had migrated from East Bengal since 1947. (East Bengal refugees constituted, according to the 1961 census, only 29 per cent of the population of West Bengal). The majority of the leaders and activists of the CPM~sponsored BSSS were also refugees.
The majority of the refugees, who had come to West Bengal in the early years of partition, following communal tension often manipulated by the power elite, were from the wealthier and better-educated landed Hindu community that had traditionally dominated Bengal’s social structure. By the 1970s these upper class refugees provided over 90 per cent of the faculty members of five major universities of West Bengal and dominated other professional classes such as law, medicine, engineering and the state bureaucracy. The refugees of the 1950s and 1960s were mostly drawn from poorer classes—artisans, landless labourers small shopkeepers and poor cultivators.23 The latter provided the bulk of support of West Bengal’s radical parties, and especially the CPM and CPML.
Support to the Bangladesh struggle provided an opportunity for the refugees from East Bengal to retaliate against the Pakistan rulers. A nostalgic feeling for their homeland also led them to believe that once Bangladesh became free they would be able to visit their homes and meet their relations there. There were other material considerations too. The properties of upper class Hindus who had left East Bengal were generally taken over by the former East Pakistan government and those of lower class Hindus were mostly misappropriated or bought at cheap prices by local Muslim influential peole. Many refugees believed that after liberation they would be able to recover their lost properties at least partially and could have two homes—one in Bangladesh and another in West Bengal.
For the older generation of educated and upper class Hindus (both refugees and non-refugees) —those who were in their 60s and 70s and had been active in the Indian independence movement, either through Congress or terrorist politics—the partition of Bengal in 1947 was a phenomenon of “great mental pain and guilt feeling,” resulting in the inevitable vivisection of the Banga Mata (Mother Bengal) largely caused by exploitation of Bengali Muslims by their class. Professor Budhadev Bose, an eminent poet of West Bengal and an alumnus of Dacca University, expressed the feelings of the refugees from East Bengal as he wrote nostalgically about Dacca and its university in his poem, “Dacca University, 1928’, published in the Ananda Bazar Patrika, April 4, 1971.
The liberation movement of Bangladesh gave them an opportunity for exploitation. Sheikh Mujib’s repeated statement that in Bangladesh there would be no difference between Hindus and Muslims, created a tremendous impact on the Bengali Hindu mind. It meant the re-union of Muslim Bengalis and Hindu Bengalis who had parted company in 1947. To use the phrase of Bishnu De, one of the leading contemporary poets of West Bengal, the Bangladesh movement brought to the Bengali Hindu “history’s most tragic exultation”.
The Bangladesh movement, above all, brought about a nationalist revival in West Bengal. Tagore’s song, Amar Sonar Baingla (My Golden Bengal) became the most popular song in Calcutta. Poet Jibonananda’s anthology, Ruposi Bangla (The Beautiful Bengal), almost forgotten by West Bengal people, went into several reprints after March 25, 1971. The frustration of the urban educated class in West Bengal, as they lost their leading position in India to other regional elites, found new expression in the Bangladesh movement. They found their own dream being realised by their ethnic brethren in Bangladesh and became passionately involved in it.
[Author and reserarcher Dr Talukder Maniruzzaman is a National Professor of Bangladesh.]
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