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CHANGING WORLD ORDER
Whither common South Asian destiny?
Sadeq Khan
Is there a scope for carving out a common South Asian destiny in the unstable matrix of global economic downturn? Can South Asian nations solve or set aside historical and newly-evolved disputes to muster a common will to build a regional fort of peace and cooperation to face the vicissitudes of changing world order?
Positive democratic index
There was hope that the year of 2009 would usher in a new political environment of close regional cooperation in South Asia. Notwithstanding the dark shadow of assassins’ bullets, suicide-bombers’ blood-letting and sectarian killings keeping a Damocles’ Sword hanging over its polity, Pakistan managed to return to democratic rule in February 2008 after almost a decade. In March 2008, Bhutan became a democracy. In April 2008, unrest and armed conflicts were ended and general elections held successfully in Nepal for a Constituent Assembly after over a decade of civil war. Maldives also had a change of government with a multi-party democracy. Bangladesh got back to democracy with a commonly accepted general election in December, 2008 after long unrest and 2 years of emergency rule.
Despite sharpening horizontal (regional, linguistic) and vertical (caste, ethnicity) contradictions radically affecting and altering its political landscape with violent disaffection and anti-social disruptions, the well-entrenched democratic order in India made a decisive choice endorsing a pragmatic leadership in general elections last May. In Afghanistan, a girja-based representative government, economically backed by the West, the United Nations and India, and militarily protected by Obama-induced surge of the NATO/International Security Assistance Force is now facing traumatic aftermath of a troubled Presidential election. It is generally veering to a pragmatic view that carrot and stick policy towards accommodation of “moderate” elements of Pushtoon (Taliban) resistance is a better option for peace and development than long-drawn war of attrition. In Sri Lanka, after the failure of concessions of limited self rule and peace brokered by Norway for break-way Tamil Tiger territories from successive elected governments of the country, the present government through a sustained military offensive has surprised most observers by totally defeating the heavily armed soldiers and the suicide-bombing squads of the LTTE. Tamil Tigers finally surrendered.
In view of such important political changes, great expectations prevail about expanded opportunity in South Asia to commonly build a strong edifice of Peace and Development in the region. But the facade of democratic progression in the region is being grossly undermined by disastrous trends and developments both internally and externally in all the countries of South Asia. Such developments are bound to give rise to isolationism and introspection as opposed to closer cooperation and confidence-building by and between the nation-states of the region.
It is a pity that the political elite in South Asian countries are patently failing to accommodate or to keep pace with the internal dynamics of respective social systems under democratic openings combined with impacts of modernisation and globalisation. The situation in each country is invariably compounded by external pressures, purposes and interventions of geopolitical import. Further complications are being created by disenchanted doctrinaires of both right and left inclinations resorting to terrorist practices, anarchic programmes and informal wars against the state/social order.
As such, latent impulses of traditional prejudice, violent conflict and sectarian antipathy are being whipped up by reckless bids of privileged cartels, classes and communities to protect their respective vested interests both in intra-state and interstate affairs. A crisis of confidence is thus all-pervading. Positive impact of democratic progression on peace and development in South Asia is disappointing, handicapped by illiberal practices and imaginative stagnation, and also somewhat stalled by the pressures of the war on terror and of global financial crisis. The result is reflected in both the Freedom of the World 2008 survey of the Freedom House, and in the Economic Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008.
In this exercise, I shall limit myself to present in some detail elements of existing dynamics country by country that impact the regional matrix of cooperation and contradiction.
Except for the outlook of distant result of sea-rise slowly devouring the territory and tourism resources of Maldives, that country does not have any serious problem affecting the regional matrix. Bhutan has a problem of Lhotshampa settlers expelled from the country as illegal aliens, creating a humanitarian issue of over 100,000 refuges languishing in seven refugee camps in Nepal, some managing to find survival-level employment and acceptance in bordering Indian territories. Other than that, Bhutan is at ease with South Asian neighbours and internally well off by virtue of its hydro-electric resources, orchards, forests, and regulated tourist trade.
Himalayan class war
It is poor, populous and hardy Nepal that has led the way with an avalanche of change that may radically affect the regional matrix. I have drawn liberally from the analysis of Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat who specialises in geopolitical studies, to describe the first phase of the transition in Nepal from monarchy to republicanism. He observes (abridged from commentary in Asia Times, April 15, 2008):
“The South Asian political landscape will never be the same again following the Maoist victory march in Nepal’s elections to a new 601-seat constituent Assembly. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (popularly called Prachanda) said his party’s victory was a mandate for lasting peace, implementation of the democratic republic and rapid economic development. The poorest country in South Asia has suddenly catapulted itself to the vanguard of democratic reform and political transformation in the region. India, which basks in the glory of its democratic way of life, at once looks a little bit archaic and tired in comparison. After 60 years of uninterrupted democratic pluralism, vast sections of Indian society are yet to realize the potentials of political empowerment. Politics in India still meander through alleys of caste and parochialism and eddies of religious obscurantism and Hindu nationalism. The upper-caste Hindu elites in Nepal used to share social kinships with the Indian political elites. The Maoists have upturned Nepal’s entrenched caste politics. The Indian electorate is yet to explore in full measure ideology-based secular political empowerment, which is the bedrock of democratic self-rule.
The Maoist government will proceed to dismantle the pillars of Nepal’s feudal structure and will take recourse to radical economic and political reforms based on distributive justice and egalitarian principles. That is bound to catch the attention of impoverished Indians in the sub-Himalayan belt sooner or later. The Indian establishment traditionally works with the Nepali Congress. Some elements within the establishment view with disquiet the prospect of the Maoists galvanizing revolutionary movements within India. Conceivably, Delhi didn’t anticipate a tidal wave of popular will favouring the Maoists in Nepal.
All the same, Delhi allowed the democratic process in Nepal to take its course. Beijing swiftly adapted to the emergent democratic forces in Nepal with great pragmatism and forged working relations with all political parties, including the Maoists. China’s interest in Nepal has increased almost exponentially. The overarching geopolitical reality is that the United States has become hyperactive in Nepalese politics.
Prachanda said Nepal will develop ‘new relations’ with the Indian leadership. He stressed the close cultural and historical links between the two countries. But he clarified that Nepal will maintain equidistance between India and China in political terms. Beijing is certain to respond to him, given the criticality of Nepal to Tibet’s security and stability. There are number of areas such as development of infrastructure, hydroelectric power or the manufacturing industry, where Nepal offers attractive business opportunities for enterprising Chinese firms. Nepal can also be a gateway to the Indian market. China’s “soft power” in Nepal is already very considerable, while Nepal is no exception to the latent “anti-Indianism” common to India’s neighbouring countries.
Any Indian assumption that Nepal is its security backyard or that it should be within India’s ‘sphere of influence’ will be untenable. If Delhi resorts to pressure tactics, sensing that the Maoists have a long way to go to consolidate their grip on political power, it might prove counterproductive.
Almost certainly, the Maoists will want to jettison the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship with India, which they consistently viewed as an unequal framework. No doubt, the renegotiation of the treaty will bring to the fore the new impulses of the three-way equations involving India, Nepal and China. Nepal has proved to be an unhappy experience for the United States and India in their newfound interest to coordinate and harmonize their regional policies. While India managed to keep its options open in a developing situation, the US policy finds itself in a cul-de-sac.”
But the table was turned. The Nepalese army led by an “adopted son” of late King Mahendra took the oath of allegiance to the democratic order established by the Nepalese parties to the peace deal that brought the Maoists from insurgency to electoral battle and ousted the monarchy in due course. The army was being quietly strengthened by US military assistance and Indian military guidance. When it came to implementation of a provision in the peace deal to absorb in the regular army, Maoist cadres, former rebels currently confined in UN-supervised camps, the Army Chief General Rookmangud Katawal began dragging his feet. He objected that this would result in politicising the Nepalese army. When he refrained from implementing the government’s order to fire eight senior army officers considered errant, the cabinet demanded an explanation and being dissatisfied, sacked the army chief by majority decision of the cabinet members. Dissenting ministers of the coalition in power belonging to UML pulled out of the government, the army chief stayed put, and the Indian-born Madhesi President of Nepal, Ram Baran Yadov threw his weight behind the army chief, ignoring the binding advice of Prime Minister Prachanda.
The Maoists accused India of encouraging the Nepal army chief to defy government order and of manipulating the President to overstep his limits of power. Prime Minister Prachanda resigned declaring in a televised speech “I have resigned from the post of prime minister from today for the protection of democracy and peace. .... The move by the president is an attack on this infant democracy and the peace process. The interim constitution does not give any right to the president to act as a parallel power.” He added that “the issue of civilian supremacy over the Nepal army” is at stake. Other Nepalese parties in parliament met at the instance of President Yadav, boycotted by the Maoists, and opted to form a new government without the Maoists who have taken to the streets demanding that the President backs down and tenders an apology to the Leader of the House. Nepal’s political observers do not foresee a return to insurgency by Maoists: “They won’t go back to the jungle but they’re more than ready to take to the streets and paralyze any new administration. They clearly command significant public support .... Prachanda’s strongly worded but dignified resignation address was a claim to the moral high ground .... that may resonate with ordinary citizens.”
The Maoists have said they could consider backing a new government if army chief Katawal is removed.
Af-Pak situation
Let us now look at the Af-Pak situation, as the mountainous belt of tribal homelands in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the USA is new deeply engaged in a protracted clash of civilisations, has been designated in the Obama administration’s geostrategic mapping, creepingly verging on the Indian-held Kashmir. NATO-led forces with a UN mandate are fighting a war in Afghanistan, considered un-winnable by many experts and former commanders engaged in that war, against Taliban resistance commanding the mountain country and its caves linked by narrow passes. The administrative headquarters in the provinces and in Kabul, and the highway network through Afghanistan are under the control of NATO and Afghan troops loyal to the alliance government that was propped up by USA after ousting the former Taliban regime. Huge amount of aid money spent in infrastructural development and humanitarian assistance for the war-displaced lined the pockets of foreign contractors and local agents more than actual performance, and did not significantly contribute to employment opportunities for the poor Afghans. Narcotic production and smuggling rings increased and defied controls. NATO operations limited to military raids and savage bombings on the basis of available intelligence led to enormous civilian casualties and collateral damages, alienating the ordinary Afghans.
In the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan, remote-controlled drone aircrafts under US command in Afghanistan are likewise targeting suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda retreats based on satellite spying and ground information. The targets are more carefully identified and pin-pointed. As such, civilian casualties are not as numerous as in Afghanistan, but the stealth attacks and resulting destructions are nonetheless generating furious anti-U.S. sentiments throughout the Pushtoon belt in FATA as well as North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, with spill over effects in other parts of Pakistan. Pakistan army was cooperating with US/NATO war efforts in the Af-Pak border belt, albeit with verbal protests about the aerial bombardments, and also in maintaining border surveillance as well as limited military operations against al-Qaeda presence. There was also a peace deal with “Pakistani” Taliban followers of a fiery cleric of swat that in exchange of reintroduction of Sharia law as prevalent in that former princely state under NWFP, the Islamic militants would lay down their arms. The Provincial Government set up Sharia appeal courts in Swat pursuant to the deal, but the fiery cleric leading the swat “Taliban” found that inadequate as quick justice under Sharia law that ordinary people wanted would continue to be baffled by regular courts. The deal went sour when the Taliban followers of the cleric entered the adjacent district of Buner to flex their muscle and enforce their strict social code at gunpoint, only an hour’s drive away from the capital. A hue and cry was raised in the USA and other western capitals about the “weak” government in Islamabad capitulating to the Taliban and about the safety of the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan under growing Taliban influence and their suspected infiltration of state organs. The military in Pakistan was persuaded to take strong measures, moved quickly to expel the armed militants from Buner, and is now combing swat valley ordering evacuation of civilians at the risk of large-scale peculation displacements.
A subtle shift in the US administrations war policy in Afghanistan was indicated by the appointment of Richard Holbrooke by President Obama as special US envoy for Af-Pak matters. The New York Times reported that after his preliminary visits and acquainting exercises in Pakistan, “Mr. Holbrooke ... said he was shocked by the problems he saw in the country [Pakistan], which he last visited a year ago,” he was especially concerned that the Swat Valley, a onetime ski resort about 100 miles from Islamabad, had been seized by Taliban guerrillas, who blow up schools, assassinate police officers and beat — or behead — those who do not adhere to their strict version of Islam.”
But appearing before the Congress, prior to a meeting between Pakistan President Asif Zardari, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US President Barack Obama in the White House, testifying that the best option for the US is to strengthen the incumbent governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan militarily and economically, and the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan is in safe and strong hands. In the White House meeting, President Obama was satisfied by renewed commitments and increasing capacity of the Afghan and Pakistan leaders to meet the al-Qaeda threat. After the meeting, he declared in front of the media that the three countries were united in their war against the common enemy, al-Qaeda. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered public apology to the Afghan President for unwarranted civilian casualties, and both the Af-Pak leaders obtained generous commitments of military and economic assistance.
Stance on Al-Qaeda and Taliban
Difference in approach appears to have been finally decided upon to isolate the al-Qaeda who threaten American interests and to keep scope of negotiation with the Taliban who are not necessarily anti-American but zealous about Pushtoon way of life and liberty. I quote below an analysis of Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar who detects Pakistani machinations behind this shift in US approach. He writes (rediff.com, February 10, 2009): “In August last year, nameless Pakistani security officials gave the widest possible publicity to the international media by claiming that Yazid (senior Al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed) was killed in a Pakistani military operation in the Bajaur area along the Pakistani-Afghan frontier. Within days, of course, jihadi ‘chat rooms’ quietly began clarifying that Yazid was very much alive. Yazid had claimed responsibility for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto: ‘We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat (the) Mujahideen.’
(Now) Yazid’s video message, which surfaced on Tuesday (February), is a serious development. He pointedly warned India of future Mumbai-style attacks. Referring to India’s ‘humiliation’ in Mumbai, he threatened, ‘India should know that it will have to pay a heavy price if it attacks Pakistan.’ Yazid also called on the Pakistani people to overthrow their civilian government and President Asif Ali Zardari.
This takes us to the timing of Yazid’s reincarnation. He has resurfaced even as India’s rhetoric over Pakistan-supported terrorism has sharply escalated. Within the past week, there have been strong statements by Congress president Sonia Gandhi invoking the name of Indira Gandhi in the India-Pakistan context, and by army chief General Deepak Kapoor that ‘surgical strikes’ against Pakistan are feasible to be undertaken by the Indian armed forces.
Islamabad estimates that whatever American ‘pressure’ on the (Mumbai carnage) issue has probably run its course. But New Delhi is now hard-pressed to consider the range of what the Indian officials have been repeatedly claiming as ‘all options’.
Yazid’s message to the Indian establishment is blunt: ‘Don’t ever think of undertaking any military adventure against Pakistan, as we too have the capability to hit you hard within India.’ This is probably the first time that Al Qaeda has publicly assumed this role — as the defender of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against an Indian threat.
The Pakistani establishment does not like US President Barack Obama’s body language. Nor has it taken kindly to Obama’s decision to keep out India and Kashmir problem (for the time being) from Holbrooke’s mandate. But it is confident that the last word has not been said in the matter, either. It will do the utmost to see that Holbrooke’s mandate is expanded somehow or other.”
Bhadrakumar accused the Pakistan establishment of concocting an Al Qaeda video that is certain to receive huge publicity in the US. (Yazid, incidentally, is cited as a key plotter in the report of the US government commission investigating the 9/11 attacks). Bhadrakumar thinks he is nothing less than the Pakistani security establishment’s ‘asset’ within the Al Qaeda. It is he who interfaces with Jalaluddin Haqqani, Pakistan’s ace figure within the Taliban’s politico-military structure. Bhadrakumar nevertheless concludes that the smokescreen lifts just enough for the onlooker to steal a glance inside the mystique world of what passes for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
But the scenario continues to be complicated by India Pakistan rivalry for increased influence in Afghanistan and its gateways to central Asia. India accused Pakistan’s ISI of involvement in the assassination of Indian military attache in Kabul last year. Pakistan in turn accuses India of using its consulates in Afghanistan to fund and guide “Pakistani” Taliban and Baluch insurgents to subvert the Pakistan state.
A former US intelligence who served in both India and Pakistan was quoted by the US magazine Foreign Policy (February 16, 2009) as saying: Both [India and Pakistan] feel they are great players at brinkmanship. But in fact they are terrible at it. They lose control very quickly. They don’t know where their people are and what they are doing. .....Afghanistan is a classic power vacuum. Neighbours see it as point of instability to guarantee their own stability or an opportunity to score points. .....
While the U.S. media has frequently reported on Pakistani ties to jihadi elements launching attacks in Afghanistan, it has less often mentioned that India supports insurgent forces attacking Pakistan. “The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there.”
The report was updated by Foreign Policy by adding that a Washington South Asia expert, among others disputed the allegation made by a former U.S. intelligence official cited in the piece that India is aiding the Taliban, although he said such support may be going to other anti-Pakistan insurgent groups. “The Indians have - by many accounts - had a longstanding connection with Baluch nationalists/separatists in Pakistan, but these are not Taliban and they aren’t active in Afghanistan fighting against US/NATO forces. So yes, India gives Pakistan grief (as Pakistan has in India), but I’ve seen no evidence that it comes from Pakistani or Afghan Taliban.”
Corollaries of Af-Pak issue
A growing feeling that the Obama administration may as an extension of its Af-Pak policy, put pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute, which offers a cause to al-Qaeda propagandists for jihad, is beginning to vex Indian policy-makers. After the gruesome Mumbai attacks, for which the lone surviving Pakistani terrorist is on trial, India suspended all talks with Pakistan, and a possible outline for bilateral settlement of the dispute put on the table by former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf lies in cold storage. Although India has been kept out of Af-Pak matters for the time being except for development activity in Afghanistan, the USA continues to consult India on all regional concerns. In particular, while granting increased military assistance to Pakistan, the USA has publicly urged Pakistan to change its strategic thinking of perceived threat from India that detracts it from war against terror. But a former US ambassador to India confirmed to NDTV after the White House summit between USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that the USA might indeed press for an effective Indian initiative to settle the Kashmir issue.
Bhadrakumar has also been predicting the possibility of Obama administration’s extended interest in the Kashmir issue. But more interestingly, he suggests that US strategists have an exit plan from Afghanistan with a different prize, after an unfinished Af-Pak mission.
Drawing attention to a corollary of the Af-Pak policy of the new American administration, Bhadrakumar in an analysis (vide About.com, December 20, 2008) ‘A Great Game for the 21st Century’ had suggested that U.S. probably looks to Win More than War on Terrorism in Central Asia.
While many of us are focused on the U.S. troop build up in Afghanistan and the Taliban and Al Qaeda presence, there is a more substantial geostrategic game afoot, according to a former Indian career diplomat, M K Bhadrakumar.
Bhadrakumar’s basic argument is that the Afghanistan war and the global war on terrorism in whose name it is being fought may help the U.S. establish an enduring presence in the region, while repelling Russia, Iran, China and potentially India from expanding their power.
Both Russia and Iran would like to expand their power in the region. One way to expand their say in the regional future would be by being able to leverage cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan to their advantage. Both countries, as well as China, offer potential supply routes to Afghanistan. The United States may need new supply routes, if protests and attacks on Pakistan routes continue.
Bhadrakumar opines that, according to the currently available evidence, the United States may trump all three by opening a line at Georgia’s Poti port. This route would go through Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to arrive at Afghanistan’s northern border. Several political gains could be achieved, including bypassing Russia and potentially offering a “Caspian oil and gas corridor” the U.S could exploit.
In Bhadrakumar’s reading of the geopolitical tea leaves, the U.S. may be losing the war on terror, but it may win something much bigger, if the U.S. continues its presence in Afghanistan.
These manoeuvrings over the supply routes bring out the full range of the bitterly fought geopolitical struggle in the Hindu Kush, which mostly lies hidden from the world opinion that remains focused on the fate of al-Qaeda and Taliban. The fact is, seven years down the road from the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the US has done exceedingly well in geopolitical terms, even if the war as such may have gone rather badly both for the Afghans and the Pakistanis and the European soldiers serving in Afghanistan.”
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh
Both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh now has governments well-inclined to increased cooperation with India in matters of economic and physical security. India washed its hands off covert camaraderie with Tamil Tigers over since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Although DMK as the party in power in Chennai state and as a member of the ruling coalition of the Government of India has been openly sympathetic to the Tigers, the Government of India remained correct in extending limited military cooperation to Sri Lankan army and navy. But India very much wants a negotiated settlement with Tamil Tigers and is loathe to lose its leverage on the Sri Lankan government over the Tamil issue. In the course of its renewed offensive against Tamil Tigers after the failure of Norwegian mediation, Sri Lanka has been depending more and more on Pakistani and Chinese military advice and support. Now that Sri Lankan army is on the verge of a military solution of the Tigers problem as apart from the Tamil issue, it has been firmly resisting pressures from high-level Indian government delegations to declare a ceasefire and negotiate peace with Tigers. India enlisted the support of Western powers and also persuaded the UN to press Sri Lanka to half its offensive and declare ceasefire in consideration civilian casualties in the operation. Sri Lanka said the Tigers were holding civilian population hostage as human shield, but agreed to stop using heavy artillery and cease aerial bombing.
As India continued to build pressure on Sri Lanka to stop short of total victory over Tamil Tigers, with high profile visits of French and British foreign ministers for advocacy of cease-fire plea, Sri Lanka reacted strongly. To fend for itself, the Sri Lanka government is increasingly tilting towards Iran, Libya and China for foreign aid as its traditional Western allies ramp up their criticism of the war against Tamil rebels.
Many Western nations have outlawed the Tamil Tigers and cut off their funding networks, but the Colombo administration is deeply upset over repeated calls from the United States and the European Union for a truce.
“Never did history unmask the hypocrisy and the sanctimony of the Western powers than (it has in) their behaviour towards Sri Lanka during recent times,’ the defence ministry said.
Sri Lankan President Mahindra Rajapakse himself vowed that he would not bow to outside pressure for a ceasefire, and lashed out at what he regards as Western interference.
“They are trying to preach to us about civilians. I tell them to go and see what they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
In Bangladesh, the new government of Sheikh Hasina with overwhelming majority in parliament and a very broad alliance of political parties to back it was decisively veering towards closer cooperation with India. The export-driven (garments and manpower) economy is also showing remarkable resilience (vide Oxford Analytica, April 20, 2009) weathering the effects of global recession and world financial melt-down, its currency gaining 25% against the Indian rupee. But the legacy of socio-political conflicts and contradictory and transitional disarray in the jump from authoritarian emergency rule to exercise of political regimentation and power may be giving rise to crippling administrative lapses and to a resurgence of violence, corruption and criminality all around. In particular, government handling of a bloody mutiny in the paramilitary under civilian control of the Home Ministry may have gone too awry for comfort. For an assessment of the situation prevailing in the country on that score, I quote Freedom House (New York, 24 March, 2009, abridged):
“The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutiny that started on the morning of February 25th – less than 2 months after Sheikh Hasina assumed the office of Prime Minister – has a myriad of implications for Bangladesh. Not only is it a security threat to the state, but it reflects the troubled civil-military relations that have plagued the nation since its independence.
The BDR’s status as a paramilitary force has two advantages for the state. As it is controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs it represents a significant military asset not controlled by the army – already rumours are rife that the mutiny was engineered by Sheikh Hasina to rid the BDR of its army officers, and so create a private army for her. As a separate issue, the BDR’s role in guarding Bangladesh’s border with India is a highly contentious issue as there are frequent skirmishes between the BDR and India’s Border Security Force (BSF). Stories of the BSF’s incursions into Bangladesh are ubiquitous in the local press, causing outrage and helping provoke the skirmishes between the two forces. These are sources of serious problems between the two nations, but the BDR’s and BSF’s statuses as a paramilitary forces provide insulation against involving their respective militaries proper – potentially leading to full-scale war.
After subduing the mutineers by calling in the army, Sheikh Hasina has requested the combined expertise of the FBI and Britain’s Scotland Yard as there has emerged a seemingly widespread opinion that the revolt was not merely over pay, but a part of a larger attack aimed at toppling government. Hopefully, it means that the findings of the investigation will not be swept under the carpet to be used at a later date against political opponents, but will become public knowledge. However, it also signals that the government does not believe itself to be strong enough to deal with the threat by itself, and the military will be watching anxiously.
The military has a history of taking control when civilian incompetence begins to severely threaten the state, not always with the disapproval of the populace. Indeed, the January 2007 army-backed takeover from the previous civilian government was met with widespread gratitude by citizens tired of feuding politicians. Under the latter’s aegis corruption had risen to crippling levels, with Transparency International labelling Bangladesh the globe’s most corrupt country for five years. The caretaker government declared the rooting out of corruption to be their foremost aim, and the anticorruption campaign’s perceived (though questionable) success meant that following the coup the top echelons of the military had an excuse to drag their heels on relinquishing even indirect control in favour of a civilian government. Essentially, a military that sees civilian governments as breeding corruption to such an extent as to endanger the state is a military over which it is difficult to assert civilian control.
Problems and games
Sheikh Hasina is certainly an embodiment of this fear. She had a very turbulent relationship with the previous military-backed caretaker government. During its reign Hasina was accused of extortion, leading to her being barred from entering the country in mid-2007 and subsequently arrested in July. Similar charges were levelled at her principal political opponent, Khaleda Zia.
The current crisis, coming so soon after the return of a truly independent civilian government will be incredibly frustrating for the military establishment, whose fears have been confirmed once again. Besides the momentary collapse of Bangladesh’s borders, allowing free rein for smugglers, many of the BDR fled once the army were deployed against them, removing heaps of weapons and military grade explosives. They were followed by local criminal groups who likewise looted the various BDR compounds, and it is feared that these weapons will be sold on the black market to Bangladesh’s Islamist groups.
Sheikh Hasina’s government needs to move quickly to fulfil its duties and gain the public’s confidence, or there is a strong possibility that the military will retake control. That would be catastrophic for attempts at the consolidation of civilian supremacy in Bangladesh, and next time around the army not give up power so easily again. Given Bangladesh’s staggering array of social, economic, and political challenges, this fluidity regarding the most basic facets of governance bodes poorly for policy coherence going forward.”
I also quote (abridged) an astute assessment by Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury (Retd), former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Indian Parliament (The Asian Age, India, March 24, 2009):“The fallout from Bangladesh’s February 25-26 sepoy mutiny is still floating in the wind. What first hits the senses is the sheer insensate savagery with which the mutinous riflemen of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) slaughtered their officers, and in some cases their families, reminiscent of March 1971 and the murder of West Pakistani officers and families in a similar manner, perhaps by some of the same units.
Sheikh Hasina is known to be well-disposed towards India, something that would be anathema to many in the political, legislative, administrative and more significantly, the military and intelligence echelons of Bangladesh, where, as in Pakistan, political power frequently flows from the barrel of the gun. India must definitely be concerned at the turn of events because the situation developing from the BDR mutiny indeed has many disquieting overtones from earlier times, such as Ms Hasina’s somewhat precarious tenure as Prime Minister from 1996 to 2001.
Ms Hasina and the senior hierarchy of the Awami League have never developed a rapport with their armed forces, somewhat akin to the relationship late Benazir Bhutto had with the Pakistan Army. Ms Hasina has never been comfortable in office, neither in her earlier 1996-2001 tenure and not now. Both Benazir Bhutto and Ms Hasina reigned as Prime Ministers but were not really allowed to rule. This is not the case with Begum Khaleda Zia and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) who are more attuned to the Army, to which Begum Khaleda’s personal status as General Zia-ur Rahman’s widow has definitely contributed.
This is important because in one perspective, the war in Bangladesh between India and Pakistan never really ended on December 16, 1971, but continued thereafter as a ‘Great Game’ between the protagonists to retain Bangladesh within their respective spheres of influence. Round one went to India with the military victory in East Pakistan in 1971, the creation of Bangladesh and the installation of Sheikh Mujib as its founding Prime Minister. He was accepted as India’s protégé, but his assassination within three years and the signal failure of India’s external intelligence services to detect, warn and protect Bangabandhu was viewed in some quarters as a substantial defeat of India’s policies and, by implication, a victory for the “other side”. Round two, therefore, went to Pakistan, but the violent, tortuous course of politics in Bangladesh thereafter does not lend itself to easy or coherent encapsulation.
Since there is now an Awami League government in office, the sepoy mutiny sounds like the opening bell for the next round of the ‘Great Game’, to destabilise the government and replace the India-friendly government of Ms Hasina and the Awami League with a Pakistan-friendly one.
New Delhi fully and totally supports the Hasina government in Bangladesh, but open Indian approval can also become a kiss of death for the Awami League. India has restricted options and has to play its cards very imaginatively and judiciously. It must, on one hand, tighten vigilance on the Indo-Bangladesh border in terms of border fencing, BSF manpower and surveillance devices and systems. And inside Bangladesh, India must encourage and accelerate economic, corporate, cultural and people-to-people, particularly Bengal-to-Bengal, contacts. All this requires hard and sustained diplomacy.”
The Indian security state
The sphere of influence of Indian security state has thus been losing ground somewhat in its extra-territorial manoeuvres. It also lost some credibility from the Mumbai attack, but demonstrated tremendous capacity in recovering from the shock and coolly handling on its own the situation arising. Despite being affected somewhat by the global financial meltdown and world market recession that followed, it remains along with China the bastion of economic growth in Asia. It is certainly eminently qualified to be in the driving seat of a South Asian train towards peace and development all around, if it could possibly relax its security concerns (and may be also its hegemonic postures) relation to its neighbours.
In the changing context of a new world order, it may also be necessary for India to reassess its relationship and develop strategic partnership (as the United States is professedly doing) with China, which is bound, quite apart from its global power status, to have rapidly growing influence in the region on two counts: its currency potential and its market potential. I feel it is necessary to discuss the first count as it has relevance to the edifice of South Asian cooperation for peace and development.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in a keynote speech at the opening plenary of Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2009 in south China’s Hainan Province, April 18, said that the economic polices of countries which issue global reserve currencies require closer supervision as part of building a diversified international monetary system. Wen’s currency comments, an apparent reference to U.S. economic management that Beijing has blamed in part for the global financial crisis, were twinned with a pledge to promote more international use of the Chinese yuan. “We should strengthen the supervision of the economic policies of the main reserve currency economies and push forward the establishment of a diversified international monetary system,” he said.
China caused a stir in March when central bank chief Zhou suggested the idea of reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar as the world’s primary unit of foreign exchange by developing the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) issued by the IMF.
But at the London G20 forum, China did not call for immediate discussion of the subject. He was not suggesting that drastic changes to the financial system needed to be taken in the short term, Zhou said.
Premier Wen said China would look at expanding its currency swap agreements that are seen as a step toward eventually making the yuan more of a global reserve asset. China’s central bank has signed six swap deals since mid-December, totalling 650 billion yuan ($95 billion), with countries from Argentina to Indonesia.
An alternate reserve currency capable of sustaining value of foreign currency reserves of developing nations, that are too weak to withstand capital market upsets, will be very keenly sought by India’s neighbours of South Asia. China is clearly readying itself for that role, on its own or with others including possibly Arab sovereign funds. India has to decide on whether to join China or to stand apart from China with a currency plan of its own to be able to hold together its neighbours on its train of common prosperity in South Asia. On the matter of bilateral difficulties that India is having with almost all its neighbours, its soft power initiatives is likely to bring results. But a more sure and sound initiative would be in special economic ties based on tariff and non-tariff concession with the neighbours, for which India appears to have been cautions and reticent so far.
I shall not dwell on the simmering insurgencies and violent conflicts that India has developed a capacity to endure in a highly unequal but traditionally conforming social structure. The slow process of change that is resulting in devolution of power in the Indian political structure, as seen by erosion of monopoly of the power elite by empowerment of depressed castes, classes and regions, may be sufficient for the country’s promotion to a global power status, ensuring its stability. But its neighbours are more likely to be pulled into more accommodative concerts of growth phenomena in the Asian theatre that are showing signs of regrouping and reorientation.
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