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Democratic use of military power
Emajuddin Ahamed
How should the military power be used in a democratic society? What should be the optimal uses of military power in a free society? Should the military play a political role? What should be the nature of civi1~military relations in a country like Bangladesh? These are some of the questions that are analyzed very briefly in this write-up.
In the developed capitalist countries, especially in Western Europe, Brhain, North America, Australia, New Zealand, supremacy of the civilian authorities has been the order of the day. Civilian rule also remained predominant in the centrally planned societies of the communist world. Both the capitalist and socialist countries have had two important societal characteristics in common. One is the presence of a broad-based consensus among the politically relevant sections of population on the nature of political power, mode of its exercise, procedure for transferring power, nature of incumbents and so on. Where this consensus is developed, there develops a corresponding belief that exercise of military power by the civil government is only legitimate, and thus acceptable. In the developed Western countries this consensus has been brought about mainly by creating strong mutuality of interests of the various social forces, generated over a longer period of time, though in the communist countries this was achieved within a shorter period, quite often with a tincture of coercion.
The other characteristic is the depth and width of organisational cohesiveness that bind the social groups in such associations as trade unions, political parties and other professional groups. The politics of a society has been, in these cases, the struggle for the definition and exercise of political power in that society. Political power has thus become more and more broad-based, spread out almost equitably to all sectors of the society through a network of organisations. The broad-based societal consensus accords legitimacy to the civilian authorities; and organisational alacrity strengthens political institutions. The armed forces, under the circumstances, become used to their prescribed role and thus become professionalised in the art of defending the country, not lording over it.
In the developing world the situation is different, however. The military elite have been playing crucial political roles in most of these states. In fact, more than two -thirds of these states have experienced military intervention already and many more are likely to do so in the future. The mi1itary elite do it either directly by displacing the civil authorities or indirectly through them.
Killing of Mujib and Zia
Bangladesh has also been affected by this malfeasance. The pre-dawn coup of 15 August 1975 by a handful of junior officers, with the help of two battalions of armoured corps of the Bangladesh Army, was the first indication of their overt intention to take over. The August coup of 1975, which resulted in the violent death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the constitutional head of the state, was closely followed by a series of coups and counter-coups until 30 May 1981 when General Ziaur Rahman, another constitutional head of Bangladesh, was killed brutally by a group of 20 to 22 military officers at Chittagong in another abortive coup.
Bangladesh was under Martial Law under General H.M. Ershad from 24 March 1982 until the end of 1986. If we look at the history of Bangladesh, we find that the military elite ruled it over for more than 9 years. Another period of 4 years passed under the shadow of Martial Law, with the men-in-uniform at the background. What is more significant is that the military elite not only assumed a political role in Bangladesh, but they also claimed that they should have the right to do so. Before the formal assumption of power in March 1982, General Ershad demanded that the military in Bangladesh should be accorded a constitutional role to ensure protection of the political system (New York Times, 14 November 1981). All these tend to take us to the gray zone of the extent of military intervention and reasons for such intervention especially in the context of Bangladesh politics.
Extent of military intervention
Military intervention in politics is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, independent political activities by the military have been widespread and of long standing. There were 48 independent states in the whole world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Three more states emerged in between 1900 and 1917. 32 of these states underwent some forms of military intervention in their political activities. Of the 28 independent states that came into being during the period 1917-1955, 13 of them had to undergo military rule. In June 1987 the United Nations Organization (UNO) had 159 member states and 82 of them (50 per cent) had been under military rule at one stage or the other.
Military intervention in politics increased all over the Third World, but it became endemic in four regions: Latin America, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. 13 of the 20 Latin American states (62 per cent), 21 of the 42 Africa states (50 per cent) and 9 of the 22 South and South-East Asian states (41 per cent) experienced military rule during the period 1958-1973. Even Europe was not free from it and 3 of the 28 states (11 per cent) underwent this experience during the period. Taking a long time frame Gavin Kennedy has shown that as many as 53 successful coup d‘etats took place in Latin America involving 16 of the 20 states, and 22, 42 and 32 successful coups took place is South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively involving 9, 14 and 25 states during the period 1945-1972. There were 280 military coup d’etats in those four regions since 1945.
There were as many as 316 successful coups during 1945-1984, and including the unsuccessful ones, the total number of coups and coup attempts were 615 during the period. Of these, 203 took place in Africa, 208 in Latin America, 113 in Asia, 73 in the Middle East and the rest in Europe. The military coups were the highest in the 1950s and 1960s.
If we look at the incidence of such coups in some specific years, we find that 12 per cent of all independent states were under military rule in 1961. It rose to 19 per cent in 1966, 27 per cent in 1973 and 29 per cent in 1975.
Having all these in view, Joseph Lapalombara commented: “Military coups are so frequent and widespread that they must be considered as significant as elections”. Janowitz’s assertion, almost in the same vein, speaks of the same thing. He wrote: “The intervention of the military in the domestic politics (of non-Western states) is the norm; persistent pattern of civil supremacy are the deviant cases that require special exploration.”
Looking at the level of intervention we can conclude that the military constitutes an
independent political force. That the military have intervened in the politics of many and widely diverse countries in the world, and that they did it in the past and are doing so at present, is indicative of a political phenomenon which is “abiding, deep-seated and distinctive.” That is precisely the reason why an increasingly growing literature has emerged on different aspects of the military.
Military intervention
Three strands of thought reflecting three sets of variables may be gleaned from the growing literature on military intervention. The first is related to the capability of the military, which is associated with the very nature of organisation of the armed forces. The organisational features provide them with discipline and cohesion, hierarchy and centralised command and unity both at the decision making and execution levels. These enable the military to take over political power promptly if they decide to act. The second is related to the group interest of the armed forces. Any threat to their group interest may propel them to move and capture political power at a lightning speed.
The third refers to the weaknesses of the political system such as fragile political institutions, chronic instability, lack of consensual leadership and legitimacy, power vacuum and low level of political culture, which in fact provide occasions for intervention by the military.
Indeed, the armed forces in the developing world enjoy three significant political advantages over civilian organisations: (a) a marked superiority in organisational strength; (b) highly emotionalised symbolic status, often in relation to national independence and sovereignty; and (c) a monopoly over the most modern lethal weapons.
With all these preponderant advantages in their bag, the military, if they decide to move and displace the civilian authorities, can do so very easily. There are some crippling weaknesses of the armed forces, however, that preclude them from taking over save in exceptional cases. Finer has identified two of them; I have added the third one. The first is the armed forces’ inability to administer any but the most primitive community; the second is lack of “their moral right to rule”. The third indicates that a long period of military rule in any society may be destructive of the qualities and values for which the armed forces are so distinctive. In fact, the military themselves become the first casualty of military rule, and that is why the military elite are highly reluctant to prolong their political role anywhere.
How to stabilise democratic use of military power in Bangladesh
How, then, can we stabilise the democratic use of military power by ensuring civilian control over the armed forces in Bangladesh? This issue has been discussed and debated by a large number of social scientists from different angles of vision. They have put forward a host of suggestions in this regard and that ranges from outright abolition of the armed forces to military professionalisation. Some scholars have suggested that a democratic state for its civilian supremacy may eliminate the coercive capabilities of military or reduce them to virtual insignificance. In rare cases however the armed forces have actually been abolished. Today we find only a few instances where the armed forces formally do not exist. These are in fact exceptional cases, created out of intricate historical situations, and not applicable to most states. In Japan, which does not maintain land, sea and air forces through its 1947 constitution, forced on it by the US, the existence of “police reserve” and “national defence force” has compromised the situation. The national defence force is as good as its national army. Costa Rica, a small state in Latin America, disgusted with repeated military coups, thwarting democratic growths in the country, abolished its armed forces in 1848-49. Even there, a kind of reserve force was created since 1980s.
Some scholars have suggested that democratic use of the military power may be ensured if the armed forces are formed with citizen soldiers. The Swiss Federations has done it by making military service a constitutionally imposed obligation in 1848 and 1874. With the exception of the top officers who are fulltime professionals, the Swiss military is still composed of citizens on temporary duty. In most other European countries since the World War II the land forces comprise troops raised by conscription for brief terms of service civilians-in-uniform. In the East, Singapore has also adopted this process.
These two methods, elimination of armed forces or diffusion of military power among the citizens, do not seem to answer the needs of most of the states in the developing world. In some cases, it is the military which symbolise national independence and sovereignty of the state, and in the formative phase of nation building this is highly significant. In some cases, the military strength embodies the penultimate phase of foreign policy of states striving for economic emancipation and national integration in these days of intense competition. In many other cases, the armed forces serve as the brokers of peace in different parts of the globe within the framework of the UN, the national army being the potent instrument. In all these cases, the national army stands out as representative of the state. How can we, then, think of abolishing the armed forces?
The concept of citizen army may be appealing to many, but reality is different. Even the citizen army needs a strong national army as its nucleus. Moreover, it is not likely to meet the demands of continuous rigorous training of the forces and its capability to handle the most modern and sophisticated weapons, which characterise the dynamic and innovative armed services these days. There are many other ways of getting citizens involved in the defence services other than this one.
Military professionalism
Naturally the last option is military professionalism which tends to create and sustain trust on the regime to which the military owe their loyalty and obedience and which they are obligated to defend. The military, especially their officer corps, must be indoctrinated in such a fashion that they would accept their loyalty to the regime as an article of faith. They must believe that military rule is an aberration, and never an alternative to democratic order. They must also believe that fire power is not a substitute for the mandate of the people. These, in fact, constitute the core of military professionalism. A professional army is expert in man-management, capable of handling organisational affairs, technically oriented and subordinate to political authority. Modern professionalism is also corporative in the sense that it generates group consciousness, encourages formation of corporate professional associations and maintains clear line of demarcation between military and civilian affairs.
The military should be professionalised to the art of defending their country, and reaching out to the people in times of natural calamity and other crises, if necessary.
Military professionalism in a society is enhanced if and when the civilian rulers themselves are steeped in democratic ethos. They should also be professionalised to the art of good governance and must be adept at stabilising the political system on the bases of consent and consensus. We must add that for the democratic use of military power in a state two conditions are absolutely necessary: (a) If the military exist, as they surely will, then they must be subject to civilian control. (b) The civilians who control the military must themselves be subject to the democratic process. If the two are synthesised, there is no room for alarm, but it is indeed a very very difficult process. The success in the area demands contributory conditions both from within and without. There must be full flowering of democratic culture in the polity internally and a respectful recognition of democratic order at the global level. These are the two sure guarantees of success of a democratic polity in Bangladesh.
References:
• Ahamed, Emajuddin, Military Rule and Myth of Democracy, Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 1988.
“Military and Democracy in Bangladesh”, in R J May and V. Selochan, eds. The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, London: C. Hurst & Co 1998.
• Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and its Critics. Yale : Yale University Press,
1989.
• Finer, S E. The Man on Horseback. London: Penguin, 1975.
• Janowitz, Morris, “The Comparative Analysis of Middle Eastern Military Institutions”, in Janowitz and J.V. Doom, eds, On Military Interventions. Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1971.
• Kennedy, Gavin, The Military in the Third World, London; Gerald Duckworth, 1974.
• Seitz, S.T. “The Military in Black African Politics”, In C.H. Kennedy and D.J. Louscher, eds, Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa, Leiden : EJ. Brill, 1991.
• Welch, C E. ed, Civilian Control of the Military, Albany: State University of New York Press. 1976.
[Professor Dr Emajuddin Ahamed, a former VC of the Dhaka University, is at present the VC of University of Development Alternative.]
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