AN ISRAELI SOLDIER'S ASSESSMENT

'No Palestine state, no peace in M.E.'

Uri Avnery

One day, I hope, a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission", on the South African model, will be set up here. It should be composed of Israeli, Palestinian and international historians, whose job will be to establish what really happened in this country in 1948.
   In the 60 years that have passed since then, the events of the war have been buried under layer upon layer of Israeli and Palestinian, Jewish and Arab propaganda. Even the eye-witnesses who are still alive sometimes have problems distinguishing between what they actually saw and the myths that have twisted and falsified the events almost beyond recognition.
   I am one of the eye-witnesses. In the last few days, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary, dozens of radio and television interviewers from all over the world have been asking me to describe what actually happened. Here are some of these questions and my answers to them.
   How was this war different from others? First of all, it was not one war but two, which followed one another without a break. The first war was fought between the Jews and the Arabs in the country. It started on the morrow of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, which decreed the partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state. It lasted until the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. That day marked the start of the second war - the one between the State of Israel and the neighbouring countries, which threw their armies into the battle.
   This was not a war between two countries for a piece of land between them, like the wars between Germany and France over Alsace. Neither was it a fratricidal struggle, like the American Civil War, where both sides belonged to the same nation. I categorise it as an "ethnic war".
   Such a war is fought out between two different peoples who live in the same country, each of which claims the whole country for itself. In such a war, the aim is not only to achieve a military victory, but also to take possession of as much of the country as possible without the population of the other side.
   Was the war inevitable? At the time, I hoped until the last moment that it could be avoided. In retrospect it is clear to me that it was already too late.
   The Jewish side was determined to establish a state of its own. This was one of the fundamental aims of the Zionist movement, founded 50 years earlier, and was strengthened a hundredfold after the Holocaust, which had come to an end only two and a half years before.
   The Arab side was determined to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in the country which they (rightly) considered an Arab country. That's why the Arabs started the war.
   What did you, the Jews, think when you went to war? When I enlisted at the beginning of the war, we were totally convinced that we were faced with the danger of annihilation and that we were defending ourselves, our families and the entire Hebrew community. The phrase "There Is No Alternative" was not just a slogan, but a deeply felt conviction. (When I say 'we', I mean the community in general and the soldiers in particular.) I don't think that the Arab side was imbued with quite the same conviction. That was their undoing.
   This explains why the Jewish community was totally mobilised from the first moment on. We had a unified leadership (even The Irgun and the Stern Group accepted its authority) and a unified military force, which rapidly assumed the character of a regular army.
   Nothing like this happened on the Arab side. But we learned this only after the war.
   Did you think that you were the stronger side? Not at all. At the time, the Jews constituted only a third of the population. The hundreds of Arab villages throughout the country dominated the main arteries that were crucial to our survival. We suffered heavy casualties in our efforts to open them, especially the road to Jerusalem. We honestly felt that we were "the few against the many".
   
   Balance of power
   Slowly, the balance of power shifted. Our army became more organised and learned from its experience, while the Arab side still depended on "faz'ah" the one-time mobilisation of local villagers equipped with their own old weapons. From April 1948 on, we started to receive large quantities of light weapons from Czechoslovakia, which were sent to us on Stalin's orders. In the middle of May, when the expected intervention of the Arab armies was approaching, we were already in possession of a contiguous territory.
   In other words, you drove the Arabs out? This was not yet "ethnic cleansing" but a by-product of the war. Our side was preparing for the massive attack of the Arab armies and we could not possibly leave a large hostile population at our rear. This military necessity was, of course, intertwined with the more or less conscious desire to create a homogeneous Jewish territory.
   In the course of the years, opponents of Israel have created a conspiracy myth about a 'Plan D' as if it had been the mother of ethnic cleansing. In reality that was a military plan for creating a contiguous territory under our control in preparation for the crucial confrontation with the Arab armies.
   Do you say that at this stage there was not yet a basic decision to drive all the Arabs out? One has to remember the political situation: according to the UN resolution, the "Jewish state" was to include more than half of Palestine (as it existed in 1947 under the British Mandate). In this territory, more than 40 percent of the population was Arab. The Arab spokesmen argued that it was impossible to set up a Jewish state in which almost half the population was Arab and demanded the withdrawal of the partition resolution. The Jewish side, which stuck to the partition resolution, wanted to prove that it was possible. So there were some efforts (in Haifa, for example) to convince the Arabs not to leave their homes. But the reality of the war itself caused the mass exodus.
   It must be understood that at no stage did the Arabs "flee the country". In general, things happened this way: in the course of the fighting, an Arab village came under heavy fire. Its inhabitants "men, women and children" fled, of course, to the next village. Then we fired on the next village, and they fled to the next one, and so forth, until the armistice came into force and suddenly there was a border (the Green Line) between them and their homes. The Deir Yassin massacre gave another powerful push to the flight.
   Even the inhabitants of Jaffa did not leave the country - after all, Gaza, where they fled, is also a part of Palestine.
   
   'Ethnic cleansing' begins
   In that case, when was the start of the "ethnic cleansing" you spoke about? In the second half of the war, after the advance of the Arab armies was halted, a deliberate policy of expelling the Arabs became a war aim on its own.
   For truth's sake, it must be remembered that this was not one-sided. Not many Arabs remained in the territories that were conquered by our side, but, also, no Jew remained in the territories that were conquered by the Arabs, such as the Etzion Bloc kibbutzim and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jewish inhabitants were killed or expelled. The difference was quantitative: while the Jewish side conquered large stretches of land, the Arab side succeeded only in conquering small areas.
   The real decision was taken after the war: not to allow the 750 thousand Arab refugees to return to their homes.
   What happened when the Arab armies entered the battle? At the beginning, our situation looked desperate. The Arab armies were regular troops, well trained (mostly by the British), and equipped with heavy arms: warplanes, tanks and artillery, while we had only light weapons - rifles, machine guns, light mortars and some ineffective anti-tank weapons. Only in June did heavy arms start to reach us.
   I myself took part in the unloading of the first fighter planes that reached us from Czechoslovakia. They had been produced for the German Wehrmacht. Over our heads "German" planes on our side (Messerschmitts) were fighting "British" planes flown by Egyptians (Spitfires).
   
   Stalin's support
   Why did Stalin support the Jewish side? On the eve of the UN resolution, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, gave a passionately Zionist speech. Stalin's immediate aim was to get the British out of Palestine, where they might otherwise allow the stationing of American missiles. A sometimes forgotten fact should be mentioned here: the Soviet Union was the first state to recognise Israel de jure, immediately after the declaration of independence. The US recognised Israel at the time only de facto.
   Stalin did not turn his back on Israel till some years later, when Israel openly joined the American bloc. At that time, Stalin's anti-Semitic paranoia also became apparent. The policy-makers in Moscow were then of the opinion that the rising tide of Arab nationalism was a better bet.
   What did the war teach you? The atrocities I witnessed turned me into a convinced peace activist. The war taught me that there is a Palestinian people, and that we shall never achieve peace if a Palestinian state does not come into being side by side with our state. That this has not yet happened is one of the reasons why the 1948 war is still going on to this very day.
   
   - SAN-Feature Service
   Uri Avnery is an Israeli peace activist who has advocated the setting up of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He served three terms in the Israeli parliament (Knesset), and is the founder of Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc).

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Serbians to choose in parliamentary polls

Barrister Harun ur Rashid

Serbia is located in south-Western Europe and shares borders with Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
   Historically Serbia had won its goals after the end of both the First and Second World Wars. But Serbia's bigger ambition to create a larger state with all Serbs from neighbouring countries failed to materialize because of flawed and aggressive policies of ultra-nationalist late President Slobodan Milosevic.
   Currently Serbian people stand at a crossroads. In a parliamentary election, they have to make a choice on whether the country should join the European Union or shift towards its traditional ally, Russia.
   For weeks polls had predicted that the pro-European coalition led by President Boris Tadic would take about a third of the votes and that the nationalist Radical Party would take a little bit more.
   The founder of the Radicals is currently on trial for war crimes at the UN tribunal in The Hague. The polls also suggested that the coalition led by Vojislav Kostunica, the outgoing prime minister would, as before, be kingmaker, but that this time around he would form a new government with the Radicals.
   It was expected that the hardliners would win after Kosovo declared independence on 17th February last. The declaration of independence has stoked expectations of an electoral backlash and a victory of the Radical Party.
   
   Kosovo's independence
   Serbia rejected Kosovo's independence. The Radicals vowed to steer the country away from the West, meaning the European Union, where many key powers recognised Kosovo and to align towards Russia which opposed Kosovo's independence.
   The countries (Russia, China, Spain, Romania, Cyprus and Greece) which oppose the independence of Kosovo have their own reasons because each country finds resurgence of ethno-nationalism within their borders.
   They consider that Kosovo's independence will boost the ethnic demands for greater autonomy or independence. They argue that recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence would legitimatize the doctrine of imposing solution to ethnic conflicts.
   They further argue that by the actions of some European Union member-states, every would-be ethnic or religious separatist across Europe and around the world has been provided with a tool kit on how to achieve recognition.
   On the other hand, those countries that have recognized Kosovo consider Serbia's domination over Kosovo's Albanians is entirely different from those other ethnic or religious conflicts. It has been a long-standing claim of ethic -Albanians to free themselves from Serbia's oppression.
   History tells us that, during the First World War, at the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1912 presided over by British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro were granted sovereignty over Kosovo.
   In the winter of 1915-1916, during World War I, Kosovo saw a large exodus of the Serbian army, which became known as the Great Serbian Retreat.
   Defeated and worn out in battles against the Austro-Hungarians, they had no other choice but to retreat, as Kosovo was occupied by the Bulgarians and Austro-Hungarians. The Albanians again occupied Kosovo.
   In the 1970s, an Albanian nationalist movement pursued full recognition as a Republic within the Yugoslav Federation, while extreme elements aimed for full-scale independence.
   
   Parliamentary Election
   In a parliamentary election held on May 11, the unexpected happened and the polls were found wrong. The Economist said: "Expect the unexpected" in the Balkans and the election results proved it.
   The pro-European party of President Boris Tadic claimed victory on the same day after partial results gave his party a 10 per cent lead over the ultra nationalist Radical Party.
   The two other parties-the party of Prime Minister Kostunica secured only 11.3 per cent and 30 seats and the party of late President Milosevic, Socialists, got 8 per cent and 20 seats.
   All this is good news for those who believe that stability in this part of Europe is best served by a Serbia heading towards the EU.
   But the hardliners are not entirely defeated. The Radical Party leader Tomislav Nikolic said he would meet with Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's conservative coalition and the Socialists to form a government.
   Now complicated bargaining will begin. The magic number of seats needed in parliament to secure a majority is 126.
   Analysts say this means that, mathematically, the Radicals together with the Socialists and Mr Kostunica could still form a government with a tiny majority. Mr Tadic plus his allies appear to have one or two seats fewer. However, it appears that a lot of work has already been done to lure the Socialists over to support the pro-European block.
   On Kosovo issue, President Tadic opposes Kosovo's independence and has reiterated on 11 May he would never recognize its statehood. Some say it is an election ploy. His opponents publicly denounced Tadic as traitor for signing a pre-entry deal with the EU-a deal that Kostunica and Nikolic contend amounts to blood money in exchange for giving up Kosovo.
   
   Serbia's EU deal
   It may be recalled that on April 29, the EU signed an agreement with Serbia which is widely seen as putting it on track for eventual membership. This was followed by an announcement that Serbs would no longer have to pay for visas for 17 European countries. Finally a big deal was signed between Fiat, the Italian carmaker, and Zastava, a Serbian cars-to-Kalashnikovs conglomerate. This foresees an investment of €700m ($1.1 billion) and the creation of thousands of jobs.
   European analysts say that if Serbia wants to enhance their quality of life and prosper within Europe, it must become a part of European Union. The issue of choosing West or East is not a matter of "pride" for the Serbs, it is about survival. Therefore, it must have a peaceful dialogue with European Commission to resolve the issue of Kosovo's independence. Mere emotion does not play in cold politics but reality and reason should guide their views and actions.
   The "carrot and stick" policy of the European Union seems to be working well with Serbia's people. They want the best and cheapest products from Western Europe and jobs within the European Union. Workers from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland have moved to EU countries and earn much more than they do in their countries. The outcome of the parliamentary elections shows that Serbian people seem to look at the West, rather than to the East.
   The writer is a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.

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Soldiers-filled Patani resembles Baghdad

Dr. Farish A Noor in Southern Thailand

As we sit by the roadside cafe sipping thick, milky tea, the ustaz (religious teacher) nods in my direction and looks away. His eyes turn to the armoured Humvee that rolls past us ever so slowly, the open roof mounting a large and rather nasty-looking machine gun.
   The soldier who mans the turret looks to be no older than 18, his head dwarfed by the large helmet and his frame rendered diminutive by the bullet-proof vest he wears. The soldiers are all clad in body armour and their eyes are hidden behind black ray-bans that reflect the searing light of day.
   The armoured car passes by at a menacing pace, like a predator about to pounce. The men in the cafe stare back, returning malicious glances. In a minute it is over and the soldiers have passed. Smiles re-appear and we continue with the business of sipping tea and talking politics.
   "You see what its like here in Patani?", the Ustaz asks me. "Its like living in Baghdad. This place is like Iraq now. The Thai soldiers are everywhere, they stop us all the time, we cannot even drink tea in peace without having a gun pointed at our faces. And the government says this is for our own good, for our "protection". Protection from what? From whom? We are Patanis, this is our land, our people. We don't need to be protected from each other. So is this what they call good governance?"
   One week in Patani and the other Southern Thai provinces of Jala and Narathiwat was all that was needed to convince me that this is indeed an insurgency war with a high human cost. Since 2004 the four southern Thai provinces have been up in arms and the relationship between the Thai government and the Malay-Muslims of the south has deteriorated to such an extent that road blocks, mass arrests, curfews and violence have become routine.
   During the course of my short stay there I encountered 34 road blocks and we were stopped four times. During the daylight hours the landscape of Patani is dotted by sandbags, outposts, guard towers, surveillance cameras and the sight of armoured cars and trucks darting back and forth across the region.
   In the evenings however it is another picture altogether. Since Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared martial law in the region more and more troops have been sent down to reinforce the Thai Fourth Army that is stationed there to police and defend the deep south. Yet despite the efforts that have been made "ranging from direct counter-insurgency assaults to mass arrests, from soft efforts to woo the Malays to funding of local development projects" nothing substantial has been achieved.
   What is worse is the rise in the number of attacks on civilians by the underground army of insurgents who may number anything from the hundreds to the thousands. Over the past four years those targeted have included religious teachers - both Muslim and Buddhists, schools and school teachers, post offices, public markets, shops and malls, and of course police stations and army camps.
   Till today no single group has come out with a set of specific demands. The Thai National Reconciliation Council has attempted to assuage the anger and frustration of the Malay Muslims by recommending that the central government in Bangkok accept and recognise that the southern provinces of Patani, Jala, Narathiwat and Satun were and remain Malay-Muslim provinces that were once independent Malay kingdoms before they were incorporated by Thailand, and that the identity and culture of the Malays should be respected at least, but to no avail.
   Instead, the powers-that-be in Bangkok have maintained that Thailand is a single unitary state with one definitive dominant culture, that of the Thai-Buddhists, and that all communities have to abide by the standards that have been set. Since the time of General Phibun Songkram in the 1940s, the assimilation policies of the Thais have been imposed on all the communities, though it is here in the south that resentment is the deepest and strongest.
   The net result has been the deepening of resentment and feelings of marginalisation and discrimination among the Malays who feel that their religion and culture are not respected. One of the consequences has been the rise in the number of vernacular Malay religious schools (pondoks) that have popped up everywhere in the south, and as one travels from one district to another one is struck by the number of pondoks and madrasas by the roads.
   The other result has been the reluctant acceptance of the Thai mainstream educational system, which forces all citizens to speak and learn the Thai language - though the Malays insist that their language (Yawi) is not something they are willing to forget. Amidst the tension and anger of the locals, native insurgents have come to the fore to give voice to the anger of the community.
   On our third night in the region a national primary school was burned down, just three kilometres from where we were. The army and police responded immediately, but at the last minute even the fire engines and rescue teams would not brave the countryside roads in the dead of night for fear of landmines and snipers: as they approached the scene their sirens were turned off and they turned back.
   This then is the impasse that prevails in the south of Thailand at the moment: During the daylight hours the army and police are present everywhere, but once dusk arrives and the light is dimmed, the roadblocks in the country roads are emptied and unmanned.
   During the dark hours of the night the countryside returns to the hands of the insurgents who continue their low-level insurgency with minimum manpower and resources, but at great cost to the state's coffers. All the high-tech weapons technology that Thailand has bought from its Western allies could not prevent a bunch of local insurgents from burning down a primary school smack in the middle of the village in full view of the locals.
   And perhaps the most difficult thing of all would be to get the two communities, the Thais and the Malay minority, to finally understand and accept each other's right to exist.
   In the words of another religious school teacher: "We don't hate the Thai people, we never have. They have their ways, their culture, their God, their religion. But why do they have to come here and bring their culture to us when we have never imposed our culture on them? Patani was a Malay kingdom even before Ratanakosin [Bangkok] existed. We were a kingdom when Ayuthaya was around. But why don't they accept this? Why can't they leave us in peace and accept that we are different?"
   Like many autonomy movements, the insurgency in Southern Thailand is fuelled by a combination of nostalgia for the past, anger over the present and the deep-rooted desire for recognition and respect. But how do you show respect to a villager when you stare at his face through the scope of a machine gun on top of an armoured car? And that, in a nutshell, is the problem.
   
   - SAN-Feature Service
   Dr Farish A Noor is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University of Singapore; and one of the founders of the www.othermalaysia.org research site.

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Lankan govt's faulty conflict
resolution tactic

Jehan Perera in Colombo

Sri Lankan government's victory in the eastern election has given rise to an acute problem that could escalate to serious proportions. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has had to decide whether the breakaway former LTTE leader Pillayan or the breakaway SLMC leader Hizbullah, both of whom contested under the banner of the ruling party, should be chosen as chief minister of the recently elected Eastern Provincial Council.
   This was a question that arose prior to the election, but to which no conclusive answer was given. So far President Rajapaksa has shown himself to be adroit in the art of causing splits in the ranks of opponents. But on this occasion, he has had to weigh the risk of a break in his own alliance with the priorities of his government.
   After a delay of nearly a week the President chose Pillayan who heads the TMVP to be the chief minister. In doing so, he has risked losing the support of a significant section of the Muslim community in the east who had voted for government believing it would obtain for them a Muslim chief minister. On the other hand, an alienation or withdrawal of TMVP support would be detrimental to government control over the east, which is contested by the LTTE. The selection of the chief minister was undoubtedly a difficult one for the President as there were important reasons for the appointment of both Pillayan and Hizbullah for the chief minister's post.
   
   Preference votes
   Pillayan had the merit of obtaining the most number of preference votes at the election, though it is reasonable to believe that a significant number of them were obtained by stuffing ballot boxes, impersonation and intimidation. The reports of the election monitoring groups make sorry reading to those who were hopeful of a free and fair election. A more compelling reason for the appointment of Pillayan as chief minister would be the TMVP's contribution to the government's victory over the LTTE in the Eastern Province. The TMVP provided, and continues to provide, invaluable intelligence to the government's security forces.
   On the other hand, Hizbullah too had reasons to expect being appointed as the Chief Minister. During the period of the election campaign when the issue of who would be appointed as Chief Minister came up, President Rajapaksa promised the position to the leader of the group that won the most number of seats. Most of the government's seats at the eastern election were won by Muslim candidates. Indeed, most of the seats in the entire Provincial Council were won by Muslim candidates, making Hizbullah the person on the government side most likely to command the allegiance of the majority of members of the Eastern Provincial Council. As the Muslims strongly feel that they are a community that is caught up in the middle of the ethnic conflict, and often victimized by the competing forces of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms, the Chief Ministership of the east would have been a reassurance that they too will be part of a political solution to the ethnic conflict.
   
   Fatal weakness
   In these circumstances it was no cause for surprise that President Rajapaksa delayed taking a decision on appointing the chief minister. But from the beginning, and notwithstanding the President's pledge regarding giving the position to the party with the largest number of votes, the odds were stacked against Hizbullah. The government's reliance upon the TMVP to maintain military control over the east was a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the hopes for a Muslim representative to be appointed as the Chief Minister. If the President had chosen Hizbullah over Pillayan, there was a risk of the TMVP withdrawing its support to the government, and even rejoining the LTTE. While this option may not be open to Pillayan, in view of the LTTE's poor track record of tolerating internal dispute, the option of going back to the LTTE would be open to the next levels of leadership within the party.
   
   Hizbullah disappointed
   Hizbullah has been open to the media regarding his disappointment at being let down by President Rajapaksa who has apparently explained that the government's rationale for selecting Pillayan was on account of the need to deal with the LTTE through military means. The government continues to see the solution to the ethnic conflict as lying in the military suppression of the LTTE and therefore the democratic potential of the Eastern Provincial Council is to be subordinated to the military imperative. Indeed, after the eastern election the government took the position that the verdict given by Tamil and Muslim ethnic majority in the province proved that its strategy had received popular backing.
   However, the fatal weakness in the government's strategy of conflict resolution is that militarily evicting the LTTE from territory over which it has administrative control will not necessarily eliminate the LTTE's ability to be present in those areas. The LTTE's ability to enter into government-controlled areas even outside the north and east and launch attacks is continuing evidence of failure on the part of the government to safeguard the country and its people. The insurmountable problem that the government faces is that so long as there is no political solution to the ethnic conflict, the LTTE will be able to maintain its support base amongst the Tamil people and undertake its operations especially in areas where they are present.
   It is also evident that the government's maximum efforts to prevent the LTTE from launching guerilla and terror strikes against military and civilian targets are only having limited success. Whether it was the suicide attack against police buses in the heart of Colombo or a bus bomb in a suburb outside Colombo, the most stringent security precautions have not worked. The backlash from these security precautions which serve as a source of intimidation and harassment to Tamils, and has led to allegations of human rights violations including abductions and disappearances also needs to be noted. The excesses stemming from these security precautions have led to international opprobrium, which can even have major economic consequences, such as the loss of GSP+ import duty concessions by the European Union.
   
   Buddhist wisdom
   The challenge for the government is to channel the opportunities that the eastern election has brought about into the direction of conflict resolution that is based on principles of good governance and human rights. The participation of the TMVP in the eastern elections and the manner in which the elections were held has come in for strong criticism from the opposition and civil society groups. On the other hand, by bringing this armed group, consisting of former LTTE cadre, into contesting elections that are within the framework of a united country, the government has shown the possibility of the LTTE doing the same some time in the future. The government has shown that an armed Tamil group can be accommodated within the structures of governance even while they are armed, so long as they do not present their fight as one for separation.
   It also appears that the majority Sinhalese population has been accepting of the government's decision to give the Chief Minister's position to Pillayan, even though he heads an armed Tamil group. Some nationalist groups associated with the government have objected to the granting of powers over police and land to the Eastern Provincial Council, which have so far not been devolved to any other province. But there has also been hardly any public agitation about the government's stated intention to devolve the full range of powers contained in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, including those of police and land.
   The significance of granting those special powers to the Eastern Provincial Council is that they will make it easier for the TMVP to transform its armed units into a legitimate police force. The devolution of power over land would also serve to reassure the Tamil people that their fear of government sponsored Sinhalese settlements in the north and east will be less likely in the future. The government's success in making the Eastern Provincial Council rise to its full potential is that it will provide the LTTE and the Tamil people with the opening to negotiate for a greater degree of power and rights in the country, on condition that they put aside the demand for a separate Tamil state in the manner of the TMVP.
   The Vesak season can serve as a period of reflection regarding the method of conflict resolution that is to be followed. The weeks prior to Vesak have shown the very high cost of war, of bombings, abductions, killings and rapes, which are all on the upsurge in the context of war.

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FASS preparing white paper
on rhino poaching

Nava Thakuria in Bloomington

The non-resident Assa-mese from India in USA, who were concerned about the increasing incidents of rhino poaching in Assam, have been preparing a white paper on the issue. This was disclosed by Rajen Barua, the chief office bearer of the Friends of Assam and Seven Sisters (FASS). Talking to this correspondent here recently, Barua also stressed the need for more awareness among the people and their co-operation to save the endangered one-horned rhinos in Assam.
   "We think volumes have been written and spoken about the ineffectiveness of the present measures to protect the rhinos in Kaziranga National Park and other sites. Now it is time to act," Barua asserted.
   The FASS was one of few organisations which consistently raised voice for a credible and high level enquiry into the ongoing incidents of killings of rhinos, and take disciplinary actions against the officials and individuals responsible for the lack of protective actions.
   FASS in a statement issued from New York last month insisted that "since the Assam government had failed miserably in its duties, the administration of Kaziranga should immediately be placed under military rule for the time being with strict orders to treat the poachers as terrorists". A citizen's vigilance committee was also advocated by them to monitor the situation on a regular basis in the national parks of the state,
   The state government, following the growing public outrage, had asked for a Central Bureau of Investigation probe into the killing of over 30 rhinos in different preserves of Assam since January 2007. The chief minister Tarun Gogoi on May 2 declared that his government favoured for a CBI enquiry into the matter.
   Earlier the civil societies and the advocacy groups of the region vigorously raised voices against the slaughtering of rhinos by poachers since the early part of 2008. But the concerned authority and the state government preferred to overlook the public resentment. For more than three months, the wildlife lovers have strongly condemned the authority of Kaziranga, which had witnessed the loss of 26 rhinos to poachers since January 2007.
   Recognised as a sanctuary for the rhinos, Kaziranga gives shelter to almost two-thirds of the total population of one-horned rhinos on Earth. A 1984 census showed that Kaziranga, which was declared a National Park in 1974, had 1,080 rhinos. The toll increased during 1975 to 1990, nearly 25 per year. The statistics showed that rhino population was found 1069 in another census during 1991. The census in 1999 provided more optimistic result as the number of rhinos soared to 1,552. The last census in 2006 revealed the number of rhinos in the park at 1,855.
   Earlier, the Nature's Beckon, an active environment NGO of the region, staged a protest rally on October 1 last against the forest department of Assam. The director of Nature's Beckon, Soumyadeep Datta, soon came out with shocking revelation that the forest department of Assam was itself involved in the illegal trade of rhino horns.
   "We have authentic information that the forest department sold more than 300 rhino horns even after India adopted the wildlife protection act in 1972. And we are ready to provide all relevant information to CBI once it starts investigating.," Datta claimed.
   In India, poaching is a punishable offence with up to seven years' imprisonment. India has been a member to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species since 1976 and hence, in principle at least, is bound by all its efforts to eliminate International trade in wildlife and wildlife parts, he added.

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Jonaid Iqbal

A journalist friend rather liked Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's body language when he met President George Bush last Sunday in Egypt's Sharm al Shaikh tourist resort. Gilani's personal diplomacy may have gone up after the meeting, and in fact he might even have moved a notch up in the estimates of Bonn, Brussels, London and Paris with his promise to fight against terrorism. But could he persuade President Bush to part with any thing for Pakistan considering that Bush has seven months more in office, and due to move over.
   Reports say, the US President promised food help to Pakistan, which sends us down memory lane, of days during the 1950s, when Pakistan was similarly pressed with food shortage, and America sent ships laden with wheat, not free actually, but Pakistan was asked to pay for it in local currency, adjusted against the PL 480 agreement.
   One gets the impression that Pakistan is moving swiftly to the USA, in view of the strategic relationship struck by President Musharraf, with the promise that he would be with the Americans, and not against them, just before USA decided to invade Afghanistan, on the strength of UN approval.
   Gilani is a good public relations manager, who does not like to offend any one, and he may have thought twice about offending a world power. He might also have utilised the opportunity to get over the messy food situation, though some people are suggesting that Gilani should get the Americans do something for research to raise agriculture, and ask for pest-free plants and seeds, as well provide scholarship to Pakistani scientists to improve the food security of the country on a long-term basis.
   In the present context, Pakistani masses don't like the USA, and accuse it of interfering in Pakistan's internal policies. Though the government keeps on saying there would be no change in foreign policy, it is to be seen how the public interprets the new expression of American leadership moving closer to the new administration ( in Pakistan).
   But then we might refer to Benazir Bhutto's favourite theme - reconciliation. After all it was the USA (and also Britain and the European Union) who nudged President Musharraf last July to promise that she would remain unharmed after she returned to Pakistan last October. But Benazir was assassinated in end December, 2007 that shows the futility of a promise not kept.
   Pakistani Ambassador Tariq Azizuddin, who was kidnapped by Baitullah Mashood in southern Waziristan, February, has now been released after living in captivity for more than 90 days. Interior Adviser Rahman Malik, who received him after the ambassador was released claimed success of his outfit, and said no ransom has been paid for the ambassador's release.
   But according to an Australian newspaper, Tariq Aziuddin was released in exchange for Mulla Abdullah, former defence minister in Taliban government, as well as 12 Taliban militants.
   But Rahman denies any deal on envoy's release: Advisor on Interior Rahman Malik has denied that government has freed a Taliban leader for the recovery of kidnapped Ambassador Tarique Azizuddin. In a clarification issued Tuesday he said Taliban leader Maulana Ubaidullah has not been freed to secure release of Tarique Azizuddin, and he is still in government custody. He denied holding talks with the abductors for recovery of the kidnapped ambassador.

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